Abstract: This paper investigates potential market forces that cause payment card rewards even when providing payment card rewards is not the most efficient. Three factors-oligopolistic merchants, output-maximizing card networks, and the merchant's inability to set different prices across payment methods-may potentially explain the prevalence of payment card rewards programs in the United States today. The paper also points out that competition among card networks may potentially make payment rewards too generous, and thus deteriorate social welfare and its distribution. The situation may potentially warrant public policy interventions.
Introduction
Payment card rewards programs have become increasingly popular in the United States.
However, providing payment card rewards may not be necessarily beneficial to consumers and society as a whole. According to the theoretical literature on payment card fee structure, in most cases the most efficient cardholder fees would be the difference between the card network's costs for a card transaction and the merchant's transactional benefit from the card transaction.
Available empirical evidence suggests that in the United States the merchant's transactional benefit from a card transaction may not exceed the card network's cost. This implies providing rewards would unlikely be the most efficient. What drives payment card rewards?
This paper is the second of a series of three papers. The first paper examined the optimal balance between the merchant fee and the cardholder fee from both efficiency and equity perspectives. 2 The equilibrium card fee structure is greatly influenced by many factors. This paper examines the equilibrium fee structure under various combinations of assumptions and identifies what factors potentially cause payment card rewards. We also consider the welfare consequences of equilibrium card fee structures. The results suggest three factors that together may explain the prevalence of rewards card programs in the United States today. They are oligopolistic merchants, output-maximizing card networks and the merchant's inability to set different prices according to their customers' payment methods. Whether per transaction costs and fees are fixed or proportional to the transaction value may also play an important role in determining the level of rewards. When per transaction costs and fees are proportional and the three factors mentioned above co-exist, competition among card networks would likely increase the level of rewards as well as the merchant fees. The higher merchant fees would result in the higher product prices, and as a result the equilibrium social welfare would be potentially lower than the social welfare without cards at all. Although the previous studies suggested competition in a two-sided market may not necessarily improve efficiency, the finding in this paper-competition in a two-sided market may potentially deteriorate efficiency-is new in the literature and has a potentially important public policy implication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs theoretical models.
Section 3 examines the market equilibrium-fee structures and their welfare consequences for different parties that are involved in payment card markets. Section 4 concludes.
Models
We use the models that were constructed in the first paper (Hayashi, 2008) as the base models here. We also make additional assumptions regarding merchants and card networks, which greatly affect equilibrium fee structure. This section first recaps our base models then makes additional assumptions regarding merchants and card networks.
Recap of the Base Models
The assumptions common to all models are the following. The payment card markets are considered to be matured. All consumers hold at least one card and merchants accept cards as long as the merchant fees are lower than a certain threshold level, which is endogenously determined.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their transactional benefit from cards as opposed to the alternative payments. A consumer's transactional benefit from a card, B b , consists of three parts.
One is a gross benefit minus gross cost from using a card, Consumers pay the cardholder fee of f when they use a card.
Merchants are homogeneous (at least ex-ante) and their transactional benefit from cards, The assumptions in terms of (i) per transaction costs and fees; (ii) consumer demand for goods; and (iii) merchant ability to set different prices according to the payment method can vary. Per transaction costs and fees are either flat or proportional to the transaction value.
Consumer demand for goods is either inelastic (i.e., a consumer makes a fixed number of transactions) or downward-sloping (i.e., the number of transactions increases as the effective price of goods decreases). A merchant either sets the same price for all of its customers regardless of the payment method or sets the different prices according to the payment method its customers use.
Additional Assumptions
Thus, oligopolistic merchants are more realistic. This paper assumes ologopolistic merchants compete according to the Hotelling model. Although the other models, such as the Cournot model, can be used to describe oligopolistic merchants, the Hotelling model is more flexible.
Merchants
Although some merchants are possibly monopolistic, many U.S. merchants are considered to be quite competitive. However, a perfectly competitive market described as the Bertrand competition unlikely reflects the reality. At equilibrium under the Bertrand competition, two types of merchants-cash-only merchants and card-accepting merchantsserve the customers separately, and because of the higher price set by card-accepting merchants, only card-using consumers make transactions at the card-accepting merchants. In reality, however, most card-accepting merchants serve both card-using customers and non-card-using consumers.
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The basic framework of the Hotelling model is the following: There are two merchants, This paper assumes the card network sets both cardholder fees (rewards) and merchant fees. Although, in reality, four-party scheme card networks do not directly set merchant fees, assuming a card network sets its merchant fees is not too far from the reality because a major part of the merchant fee (70-80 percent) is an interchange fee, almost all acquirers entirely pass through the interchange fee to merchants, and the acquirers' charges to merchants in addition to the interchange fees seem not to vary very much within an industry. In contrast, assuming a card network (four-party scheme) sets its cardholder fees may appear to be unrealistic. Cardholder fees, especially credit card rewards, vary by card issuers: Large card issuers tend to provide more generous rewards than their smaller counterparts. However, about 80 percent of the total fourparty scheme credit cards are issued by the top 10 card issuers. Although it is difficult to Card networks compare the level of rewards among the top 10 issuers, if, as card networks and their issuers claim, they compete vigorously in the consumer-side of the payment card market, then the level of rewards should be very close to the difference between the interchange fees and the issuer's costs of processing a card transaction. Again, card issuers' costs of processing a card transaction vary. But if the top 10 issuers' costs of processing a card transaction are similar, then the interchange fees set by a card network greatly influence the level of rewards on the cards issued by the top 10 issuers.
There is a variety of assumptions about the objective of payment card networks, but the objective can be abstracted as either profit-or output-maximization. Profit-maximization is obvious, but output-maximization may not be. When card networks compete, each card network may reduce its markup to undercut its' rival card networks until the markup reaches the reservation markup. And the reservation markup may potentially be very close to zero. In such a case, card networks likely aim to increase their market share as much as possible. Even when card networks are monopolistic (potentially collude), their objective can be output-maximization.
In a four-party scheme card network, it is possible that each acquirer and issuer gets a small fixed markup. Typically, an acquirer's markup is small, and because of the intensified competition among issuers, each issuer may get a small markup even when the card network they join is monopolistic.
Competitive card networks' behavior is likely affected by their cardholders' homing behavior. When a cardholder holds only a single-branded card or has a strong preference among cards (singlehoming), then each card network can set monopolistic merchant fees. In contrast, if all cardholders hold multiple cards and they are indifferent among those cards (multihoming), then card networks cannot set monopolistic merchant fees, because merchants may influence their customers' choice of payment methods. In the model, we assume that singlehoming cardholders are not sensitive to rewards when deciding which card to use, while multihoming cardholders are very sensitive to rewards and they always choose a card with the highest level of rewards among the cards the merchant accepts.
In this paper, three types of card networks are considered: (i) profit-maximizing monopoly, (ii) output-maximizing monopoly, and (iii) output-maximizing competing networks with cardholders who are all multihoming. Although we do not explicitly consider the case of output-maximizing competing networks with some singlehoming cardholders, the results would be somewhere between those of an output-maximizing monopoly network and those of outputmaximizing duopoly networks with cardholders who are all multihoming. 
Market Equilibrium
Hayashi (2008) examined the most efficient fee structure under various combinations of the assumptions. In most cases, the most efficient cardholder fee is the difference between the card network's costs for a payment card transaction and the merchant transactional benefit from the card transaction. This implies that unless the merchant transactional benefit from a card exceeds the card network's costs of processing a card transaction, providing payment card rewards to consumers is less efficient. According to the available cost studies in the United States, the merchant transactional benefit from a card may not be higher than the card network's costs.
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This section examines the equilibrium fee structures and their influence on the welfare of different parties, such as card-using consumers, non-card-using consumers, merchants, and Nevertheless, payment card rewards programs are prevalent in the United States.
6 Output-maximizing networks may have a positive reservation markup per transaction; however, this section assumes the markup is zero (i.e., the profit of output-maximizing network is zero) for simplicity. 7 These cost studies are Garcia-Swartz et. al. (2006 ), Food Marketing Institute (1998 ), and Star Network (2006 , 2007 . See also Hayashi (2008) Because tedious calculations are required to obtain market equilibrium fee structures under various combinations of assumptions, the below summarizes the results. Detailed calculations are in the Appendix.
Market Equilibrium under No-discriminatory Pricing
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the equilibrium fee structure and the welfare consequences, respectively, when merchants set the same price for card-using consumers and consumers who use an alternative payment method. There are several key observations.
First, in all three scenarios, a profit-maximizing monopoly network would set the most efficient cardholder fees. This implies that if providing rewards to card-using consumers is not the most efficient, then the profit-maximizing monopoly network would not provide rewards.
However, this does not necessarily imply that social welfare is maximized under a profitmaximizing card network. Except for Scenario I, social welfare is also affected by the product price, which is affected by the merchant fee. The merchant fee set by the profit-maximizing monopoly network is higher than the merchant's transactional benefit from cards, which implies the merchant fee is not necessarily at the most efficient level. As a result, with profit-maximizing monopoly network(s), social welfare may not be reached at the maximum level (except for Scenario I).
Second, in all three scenarios, an output-maximizing monopoly network would set cardholder fees lower than the most efficient cardholder fees. This implies that even when providing rewards is not the most efficient, the output-maximizing monopoly network would likely provide rewards to card-using consumers. Because the highest merchant fee the monopoly network can set increases as the cardholder fee decreases (or the level of rewards increases), the merchant fee set by the output-maximizing monopoly network is higher than that set by the profit-maximizing monopoly network. As a result, the equilibrium product prices set under the output-maximizing monopoly network are higher than those set under the profit-maximizing monopoly network. Social welfare under the output-maximizing monopoly network is also lower than that under the profit-maximizing monopoly network.
Third, whether competing card networks would set their cardholder fees at the most efficient level depends on two factors. One is cardholders' homing behavior and the other is the nature of per transaction costs and fees. When all cardholders are singlehoming (either they have only one card or they have a strong preference and cardholder fees do not affect their card choice), competing card networks can act like an output-maximizing monopoly network. When all cardholders are multihoming (i.e., they have multiple networks' cards and are indifferent among cards as long as the cardholder fees are the same), the equilibrium cardholder fee depends on whether per transaction costs and fees are fixed (Scenario I) or proportional to the transaction value (Scenario II). If the former is the case, the competing card networks would set their cardholder fee at the most efficient level and their merchant fee at the merchant's transactional benefit. This is because oligopolistically competing merchants would only accept the cards with the lower merchant fee. If the latter is the case, the competing card networks would set their cardholder fees as low as possible. As a result, the merchant fees can be higher than the fees set by monopoly card networks. In this case, two types of merchants would co-exist ex-post: One type of merchants would accept the cards with the lower merchant fee only, while the other type of merchants would accept both networks' cards. In fact, the card network with the higher merchant fee (thus the lower cardholder fees) would have more transactions than its rival card network. Knowing at least some merchants would accept both cards, card networks would not lower their merchant fees. Rather, they would raise merchant fees and lower cardholder fees in order to increase their card transactions.
The card network can increase its merchant fee until one type of merchants would become more profitable by rejecting both cards than rejecting the cards with the higher merchant fees, given the other type of merchants would accept both networks' cards.
Thus, competition among card networks would likely increase the equilibrium merchant fee and the level of payment card rewards.
Fourth, related to the previous observations, whether per transaction costs and fees are fixed (Scenario I and III) or proportional to the transaction value (Scenario II) would significantly affect social welfare. If the former is the case, social welfare with cards is always at least the same as social welfare without cards. While merchant profits are not affected by competition among card networks and their objectives, the surplus of consumers as a whole is higher when card networks are competing (Scenario I). In contrast, if the latter is the case (Scenario II), social welfare with cards is not always higher than or the same as social welfare without cards. Social welfare under profit-maximizing monopoly network is always higher than social welfare without cards, while social welfare under output-maximizing monopoly or competitive card networks could be higher or lower than social welfare without cards. It depends on factors, such as card networks' costs of processing a card transaction, merchants' transactional benefit from cards, and consumers' transactional benefits from cards. Consumer surplus could be higher under output-maximizing card networks than under profit-maximizing card networks. Network competition may improve merchant surplus but it does not improve consumer surplus; rather in some cases it deteriorates consumer surplus.
Market Equilibrium under Discriminatory Pricing
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the equilibrium fee structure and the welfare consequences, respectively, when merchants set different prices for card-using consumers and consumers who use an alternative payment method. There are four key observations.
First, under Scenario I, where per transaction costs and fees are fixed regardless of the transaction value, a card fee structure has no effect on the number of card transactions, rather the sum of the two fees-the merchant fee and cardholder fee-affects the number of card transaction.
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Second, competition among card networks would unlikely influence the equilibrium fee structure. Under Scenario I, since the sum of the two fees determines the number of card transactions, a card network that maximizes its output sets the sum of the two fees at the card network's costs of processing a transaction, regardless of whether it is monopoly or competing.
Competition would unlikely influence the equilibrium fee structure under Scenario II, either.
Competing card networks would not set their merchant fees lower than the fee set by the outputmaximizing monopoly network because it would set its merchant fee as low as possible in the realistic range of the merchant fees.
In this case, the card networks would not have an incentive to provide rewards. In contrast, under Scenario II, where per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value, a card fee structure still affects the number of card transactions. It is likely that the lower the merchant fees the more the number of card transactions. Thus, a card network that maximizes its output would increase the cardholder fee rather than providing rewards to card users. Even a card network that maximizes its profit would increase the cardholder fee if more transactions are profitable than higher markups per transaction. Third, in contrast to the case where merchants set the same prices for all their customers, the fee structure set by a profit-maximizing monopoly network would not lead to the most efficient number of card transactions; rather, it leads to a fewer number of card transactions. The fee structure set by an output-maximizing card network would lead to the most efficient number of card transactions under Scenario I and it would lead the number of card transactions that is more efficient than that the number of card transactions with a profit-maximizing card network under Scenario II.
Fourth, related to the third observation, social welfare is higher with output-maximizing networks than with a profit-maximizing monopoly network. Nevertheless, even a profitmaximizing monopoly network improves social welfare from that without cards at all. This implies social welfare with cards is always higher than social welfare without cards.
Factors that Drives Payment Card Rewards
The observations in the previous subsections suggest three potential market forces that together may drive payment card rewards. The first is oligopolistic merchants, the second is the merchant's inability to set different prices across payment methods, and the third is outputmaximizing card network(s).
As mentioned, merchants are unlikely perfectly competitive, but some merchants may be monopolistic at least locally. Having rewards at equilibrium with monopolistic merchants is possible but in rather limited circumstances. 11 It is easy to show that providing rewards is unlikely to be at equilibrium when merchants are monopolistic and consumers make a fixed number of transactions. In this case, monopolistic merchants would not accept cards if the merchant fee exceeds their transactional benefit, and thus card networks cannot provide rewards without incurring losses. When a consumer's demand function for goods is downward-sloping, the equilibrium cardholder fee may potentially be negative. In this case, monopolistic merchants would accept the cards even when the merchant fee exceeds their transactional benefit because accepting the cards may induce a consumer demand curve shift upwards.
In contrast, rewards can exist with oligopolistic merchants in much broader circumstances, as has been shown in the subsection 3.1.
As has been shown in the subsection 3.2, when merchants set different prices according to their customers' payment methods, card networks do not have an incentive to provide rewards (Scenario I) or card networks have an incentive to set their merchant fees as low as possible and thus, they set their cardholder fees higher (Scenario II). Therefore, if merchants are allowed to set different prices across payment methods and they actually do, then payment card rewards are less likely to exist at equilibrium.
Output-maximizing card networks are more likely to provide rewards than profitmaximizing card networks. When merchants are oligopolistic and set the same price regardless of their customers' payment methods, a profit-maximizing monopoly card network would not set rewards level that is higher than the most efficient level, while an output-maximizing monopoly network or output-maximizing competing network would set rewards level that is higher than the most efficient level.
The observations also suggest that the rewards level could be higher under competitive card networks and as a result, efficiency could be deteriorated in some circumstances. The previous literature on two-sided markets suggests that competition in a two-sided market does not necessarily improve efficiency but few studies suggested that competition in a two-sided market may deteriorate efficiency. In the context of the payment card market, Guthrie and Wright (2007) found that competition among payment card networks would not improve efficiency when all cardholders are singlehoming, while it would improve efficiency as more cardholders become multihoming. The results in this paper are consistent with their results because Guthrie and Wright assumed per transaction costs and fees are fixed. However, when per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value, competition among card networks would not improve efficiency even if all cardholders are multihoming; rather, it would potentially deteriorate efficiency. In this sense, the paper makes a contribution to the literature by showing a potential negative effect of competition on efficiency in a two-sided market.
Conclusion
This paper investigated what market forces drive payment card rewards, when providing rewards may not be the most efficient. The paper identified three factors that together may explain the prevalence of rewards programs in the United States today. They are outputmaximizing card networks, oligopolistic merchants and the merchant's inability to set different prices across payment methods. Existence of these three factors in the U.S. payment card market is quite plausible. Although whether per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value is an empirical question, the theoretical models suggest that when per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value, the equilibrium social welfare would potentially be lower than the social welfare without cards at all. Consumers as a whole and merchants would be worse off, compared with the economy without cards at all. This may warrant public policy interventions. In this case, enhancing competition among card networks would not improve efficiency but would potentially deteriorate efficiency. The equilibrium fee structures and their welfare consequences may be useful for policymakers when they consider policy options. Notes: *: The number of card transactions is at the most efficient level; however, due to a higher merchant fee, the equilibrium product price is higher than the most efficient product price. Thus, the social welfare is not maximized at equilibrium. **: The equilibrium fee structure results in the most efficient marginal card users; however, due to a higher merchant fee, the equilibrium product price is higher than the most efficient product price. Thus, the social welfare is not maximized at equilibrium. Fewer † More or fewer † Notes: †: The number of card transactions is compared with the most efficient number of card transactions when product prices for card-using consumers and non-card-using consumers are the same. Thus, the number of card transactions is not necessarily the most efficient when merchants are allowed to set different prices for these two groups of consumers. Equilibrium fee structure under Scenario III is not available. Card 2. The equilibrium fee structure is:
Scenario II: Fixed Demand and Proportional Costs and Fees
In contrast to the case where per transaction costs and fees are fixed, the Hotelling merchant's profits are affected by the card fee structure and transactional benefit from cards, even when each merchant takes the same strategy as its rival's. When both merchants reject cards, each of them sets its price at:
And each earns profit 0 π :
When both merchants accept cards, each sets its price at:
and each earns profit
Consider the highest merchant fee the monopoly card network can charge to the merchants. Suppose Merchant A accepts the cards but Merchant B does not. Each merchant sets its price at:
And each merchant earns the following profit, respectively,:
It is difficult (if not impossible) to analytically obtain the highest merchant fee that monopoly card networks can charge. However, numerical examples suggest that the highest merchant fee is slightly less than the sum of the merchant's transactional benefit and the average consumer's net transactional benefit, i.e.,
Profit-maximizing monopoly network
The profit-maximizing monopoly network solves the following problem:
Max ,
It is difficult to analytically solve the equilibrium fee structure; however, the numerical examples suggest that the equilibrium fee structure is: 
where
; and
Since analytical solutions are difficult to obtain, we use numerical examples to examine the equilibrium. Suppose Network 2 sets its cardholder fee at In contrast to Scenario I, Merchant A's profit is also likely higher than that when both merchants accept Card 2. Thus, given the rival merchant accepts Card 1 only, accepting Card 2 is the most profitable strategy.
In fact, Network 2's number of card transactions is greater than Network 1's. Knowing one of the two merchants accept Card 2, Network 2 has no incentive to reduce its merchant fee; rather, it would lower its cardholder fee further by raising its merchant fee. Although Network 1 would be able to make at least one merchant accept Card 1 only by reducing its merchant fee, it would have a smaller number of transactions than that when it sets the same merchant fee (thus cardholder fee) as Network 2's. As a result, both networks have an incentive to reduce their cardholder fees and raise their merchant fees. When the lowest transactional benefit for consumers is relatively high, both networks set their cardholder fees at the lowest transactional benefit. Thus, the equilibrium fee structure is: However, when the lowest transactional benefit for consumers is relatively low, the above would not be equilibrium fee structure. When both networks set their merchant fees high enough, Merchant B's most profitable strategy changes from accepting Card 1 only to rejecting both cards. At those merchant fees, given Merchant B rejects both cards, Merchant A's most profitable strategy is rejecting both cards. Thus, both networks may not set their merchant fees at such a high level. The threshold level of the merchant fees depends on other variables, but it is higher than the equilibrium merchant fee set by output-maximizing monopoly network. 
Scenario III: Downward-Sloping Demand Curve and Flat Costs and Fees
In contrast to the previous two scenarios, where consumers make a fixed number of purchases and thus transactions, it is difficult to obtain analytical solution when each consumer's demand function is downward-sloping. Even equilibrium product prices are difficult to obtain when two merchants take different strategies. We are able to predict what the equilibrium fee structure looks like by making an additional assumption when cards are provided by monopoly networks; however, in order to predict the equilibrium fee structure when cards are provided by competing networks, we need to use more sophisticated simulation methods than just numerical examples used in this paper. Therefore, here we only examine the equilibrium fee structure when cards are provided by monopoly networks.
We assume that if one of the two merchants rejects the cards, the card-rejecting merchant changes its product price, but the card-accepting merchant keeps its price at the same price level where both merchants accept the cards. The card-rejecting merchant's profit derived under this assumption is likely higher than the profit when both merchants change their product price.
Thus, the highest merchant fee the monopoly networks charge ( m ) is likely lower than the highest merchant fee they charge ( m ) when both merchants adjust their product prices. As long as monopoly card networks set the merchant fee at m , both merchants accept the cards. The product price they set is:
and
Numerical examples suggest that the equilibrium fee structure is: , c m f ≥ + , and
Numerical examples suggest that it is quite likely to have corner solutions for this problem. cardholder fee is likely lower than the efficient cardholder fee. The merchant fee is higher than the efficient one, so is the product price.
Discriminatory Pricing Scenario I: Fixed Demand and Flat Costs and Fees
When both Merchants A and B accept the cards, they set the price for cash users at Notice that marginal card user is determined by the total fee, not by the fee structure. It is easy to show that rejecting the cards always makes a merchant worse off, given the other merchant accepts the cards. 
Scenario II: Fixed Demand and Proportional Costs and Fees
When both Merchants A and B accept the cards, they set the price for cash users at 
Notice that, unlike in the case of flat per transaction costs and fees, the card fee structure still affects the marginal card user. . The marginal card user is, therefore, defined as:
It is difficult to obtain the highest merchant fee that monopoly card networks can charge.
Numerical examples suggest that the highest merchant fee is unlikely to exist. A merchant's best strategy is likely to accepting the card regardless of its' rival's strategy and the merchant fee. In fact, as long as a merchant's transactional benefit from a card is positive, the lower the merchant fees, the greater the output (i.e., more consumers use cards instead of using cash). Therefore, Whether a profit-maximizing monopoly network would raise or lower the merchant fee depends on the factors mentioned above. According to numerical examples, for a reasonable range of the merchant fee (say from -10 percent to 10 percent), in some cases, the card network's profit monotonically increases; in some cases, it monotonically decreases; and in other cases, it first decreases and then increases as the merchant fee increases. Generally, the higher the merchant fee, the lower the cardholder fee. Thus, the merchant fee set by a profit-maximizing monopoly network is either the highest or the lowest in the range.
Scenario III: Downward-Sloping Demand Curve and Flat Costs and Fees
Since it is extremely difficult to obtain analytical solution in this case, we will leave it for future research. 
